





Death of the Digital Pamphleteers: 








“There are only two ways of telling the complete truth - 
anonymously and posthumously.” 
       - Thomas Sowell1 
                                                
1 Quotationary 887 (Leonard Roy Frank ed., Random House 1999). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 “The Internet has revolutionized the computer and 
communications world like nothing before.”2 Not since the 
invention of the movable type printing press by Johannes 
Gutenberg in 14363 has there been such a dramatic shift in the 
ease and speed with which information can be disseminated. In 
fact, from the perspective of sheer numbers, Gutenberg was an 
amateur. He produced only about 180 copies of his famous bible;4 
Internet search engine Google has cataloged over eight billion 
web pages5 and it is estimated that over 100 million “blogs”6 
                                                
2 Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, The 
Internet Society, 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited 
Nov 13, 2005). 
3 Mary Bellis, Johannes Gutenberg and the Printing Press, 
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/blJohannesGutenberg
.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2005). 
4 Wikipedia: Gutenberg Bible, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gutenberg_Bible (last visited Oct. 
26, 2005). 
5 Google Corporate Information: Google Milestones, 
http://www.google.com/corporate/history.html (last visited Oct. 
27, 2005). 
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exist.7 While a finished Gutenberg bible took three years to 
produce8 and cost the equivalent of three years’ wages,9 today 
anyone can set up their own blog or web page in minutes, at no 
(or little) cost,10 and it may be instantly viewed by one of the 
nearly one billion worldwide Internet users.11  
                                                
6 A “blog” is short for “web log,” defined as “a web-based 
publication of periodic articles (posts), usually presented in 
reverse chronological order. It is an online journal with one or 
many contributors.” Wikipedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog#Blog_Defined (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). The people who maintain or contribute to blogs 
are called “bloggers.” Id. 
7 The Blog Herald Blog Count October 2005, 
http://www.blogherald.com/2005/10/10/the-blog-herald-blog-count-
october-2005/ (last visited October 30, 2005). 
8 Wikipedia, supra note 4. 
9 History Guide: The Printing Press, 
http://www.historyguide.org/intellect/press.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). 
10 See, e.g., Blogger, http://www.blogger.com/start (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2005). 
11 World Internet Users and Population Stats, 
http://www.Internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Oct. 
 4 
 These online journals give writers access to millions of 
potential readers, far beyond the scope of traditional print 
publications.12 And given the relative anonymity of the Internet, 
bloggers can, for the most part, hide behind their computers, 
insulated from the repercussions of whatever they write. 
 On a lesser, but no less important scale, the pamphleteers 
of pre-Revolutionary America were the bloggers of their time. 
Beginning around 1760, hundreds of ordinary people – lawyers, 
farmers, ministers, merchants – took up the pen (and the 
printing press) to express their political ideas.13 The pamphlets 
they produced were quick, cheap, provocative, and, for the most 
part, written anonymously.14 Who can blame them, given the 
rumblings of revolution on the horizon? In writing anonymously, 
“[t]he pamphleteers amounted to the nation’s first underground 
                                                
30, 2005). 
12 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 897 (1997) (“any person 
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that 
resonates farther than it could from any soapbox”). 
13 Christopher B. Daly, Are Bloggers Journalists? Let’s Ask 
Thomas Jefferson, http://www.bu.edu/cdaly/whoisajournalist.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2005). 
14 Id. 
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press, a guerilla counterpart to the established newspapers.”15 
They had the freedom to write what they believed should be read, 
with little regard to possible ramifications. 
 Today’s political bloggers also have that freedom – for 
now. New regulations currently under consideration threaten 
bloggers’ anonymous political speech16 by perhaps ultimately 
subjecting it to the disclosure rules of the Federal Election 
Campaign Act (FECA)17 as amended by the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act (BCRA, or “McCain-Feingold” after the legislation’s 
sponsors).18  
 This paper reviews major legislation and court decisions 
regarding political speech and disclosure, takes a look at 
political speech on the internet (specifically in the form of 
blogs), and examines how that legislation and case precedent 
might be applied to force disclosure of the authors behind 
anonymous online political speech. Recent regulatory and 
legislative action aimed at clarifying disclosure rules will 
                                                
15 Id. 
16 Internet Communications, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,967 (proposed Apr. 4, 
2005) (proposing a redefinition of “public communication” to 
include Internet communications). 
17 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225. 
18 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155. 
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also be examined. Given, however, the importance placed on 
political discourse in this country, and our long history of 
anonymous commentary, the best thing to do with online anonymous 
political speech is to leave it alone, and let the reader place 
their own value on it.  
  
II. BACKGROUND 
 “The lack of money is the root of all evil.”  
       - Mark Twain19 
 The Federal Election Campaign Act fundamentally changed 
then existing Federal campaign finance laws.20 One of the major 
ways the Act revised then-current law was in the area of 
campaign finance disclosure. Every candidate, political action 
committee (PAC), and party committee was required to file a 
quarterly report listing the name, address, occupation, and 
business of every contributor who gave more than $100 in a 
                                                
19 Mark Twain, Mark Twain: Collected Tales, Sketches, Speeches, & 
Essays, 1891-1910 944 (1992). 
20 FEC, The Federal Election Campaign Laws: A Short History, 
http://www.fec.gov/info/appfour.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 
2005). 
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year.21 Every individual who independently spent more than that 
amount in a year had to file their own separate statement with 
the same information.22 The Act also placed on individuals and 
groups a limit of $1,000 per calendar year for independent 
expenditures “relative to a clearly identified candidate.”23 The 
Act defined “contribution” as a “gift, subscription, loan, 
advance, or deposit of money or anything of value” made in an 
attempt to influence the outcome of a Federal election.24 
“Expenditure” was similarly defined.25 The new law immediately 
exposed the shortcomings of the previous disclosure scheme: 
                                                
21 The Campaign Legal Center, The Federal Election Campaign Act: 
A New Era of Reform, in A Brief History of Money and Politics, 
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-34.html (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). 
22 Pub. L. No. 92-225 § 305; see also Trevor Potter, Buckley V. 
Valeo, Political Disclosure and the First Amendment, 33 Akron L. 
Rev. 71, 73 (1999). 
23 Ryan Ellis, "Electioneering Communication" under the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002: A Constitutional 
Reclassification of "Express Advocacy," 54 Case W. Res. 187, 191 
(2003). 
24 Pub. L. No. 92-225 § 301(e). 
25 Id. § 301(f). 
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reported contributions increased tenfold by 197226 despite the 
fact that the Act imposed certain contribution and expenditure 
limits.27  
 
1. A Challenge to the Act 
 New York Senator James L. Buckley and former Senator Eugene 
McCarthy challenged the Act’s compelled disclosure and 
expenditure limit requirements in Buckley v. Valeo28 as 
unconstitutional intrusions on the First Amendment rights of 
free speech and freedom of association.29 While the Court agreed 
with Sens. Buckley and McCarthy that expenditure limits were not 
constitutional, they found that the disclosure rules had 
sufficiently compelling reasons to survive. 
 
 A. Expenditure Limits Limit Freedom of Association 
 The Court, in examining the limits placed by the Act on 
expenditures, did not find that they “serve[d] any substantial 
governmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of 
                                                
26 The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 21. 
27 Pub. L. No. 92-225 §§ 104, 608. 
28 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
29 Brief of Appellant at ??, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975) 
(Nos. 75-436 and 75-437). 
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corruption in the electoral process.”30 The Court did find a 
“heav[y] burden[]” on “core First Amendment expression.”31 That 
burden, the Court reasoned, required a precision in the 
expenditure limits that was lacking: “[t]he Court determined 
that the definition of independent expenditures was 
unconstitutionally vague because the phrase ‘relative to’ did 
not clearly indicate permissible and impermissible speech.”32 
Accordingly, the Court struck down the expenditure limits as 
“constitutionally infirm.”33 
 
 B. Compelled Disclosure is Compelling 
 Although the Supreme Court warned that the Act’s compelled 
disclosure could “seriously infringe” on First Amendment 
freedoms,34 it nonetheless found the Act’s disclosure provisions 
constitutional. The Court noted three “sufficiently important” 
governmental interests that warranted disclosure: (1) 
“disclosure provides the electorate with information ‘as to 
where political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by 
                                                
30 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48. 
31 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 48. 
32 Ellis, supra note 23. 
33 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 143. 
34 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64. 
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the candidate’ in order to aid the voters in evaluating those 
who seek federal office”; (2) “disclosure requirements deter 
actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by 
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of 
publicity”; and (3) “recordkeeping, reporting, and disclosure 
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data 
necessary to detect violations” of the Act.35  
 The Act was amended by Congress several times, but the core 
disclosure rules remained untouched. Later Supreme Court 
decisions essentially continued the Buckley reasoning as applied 
to disclosure requirements.36 
 However, “[o]ver time, FECA's restrictions on campaign 
funding were significantly undermined by aggressive party 
fundraising practices and weak or non-existent responses to 
these practices by the FEC.”37 In particular, the FEC allowed 
party committees to raise and spend significant amounts of money 
on so-called “party-building activities” and on administrative 
                                                
35 Id. at 66-68 (internal citations omitted). 
36 Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 
Elect. L. J. 251, 272 (2004). 
37 The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 21. 
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costs.38 Eventually, these funds—called “soft money”—came to be 
used on other activities that directly supported the election of 
specific federal candidates.39  Beginning with the 1996 election, 
national and state party committees, with negligible objection 
from the FEC, came up with a new, more effective way to use soft 
money: issue ads.40 
 
2. Issue advocacy 
 So-called “issue ads” were first brought to the fore in 
Buckley. “[T]he Supreme Court drew a distinction between 
communications expressly advocating the election or defeat of a 
federal candidate and those referring to candidates, but not 
expressly mentioning a candidate’s election or defeat.”41 Those 
communications that merely refer to candidates are more 
familiarly called “issue ads.” Issue ads have been termed “a 
communication to the public whose primary purpose is to promote 




41 Trevor Potter & Kirk L. Jowers, Issue and Express Advocacy 2 
(The Brookings Institution 2002), 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cf/sourcebk/IssueExpressAd.pd
f (emphasis added). 
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a set of ideas or policies,”42 and usually are not paid for 
directly by a particular candidate. Express ads, however, are “a 
communication to the public whose primary purpose is to advocate 
the election or defeat of a candidate,”43 and usually are paid 
for by a candidate or his agent. 
 Although the Buckley Court had generally upheld the Federal 
Election Campaign Act’s disclosure requirements as applied to 
expenditures for express ads, it found that those requirements 
applied to expenditures that purchased mere issue ads 
unconstitutional.44 In attempting to cure the unconstitutional 
vagueness of the Act’s definition of “independent expenditure,”45 
the Court interpreted the phrase “relative to a clearly 
identified candidate” to mean “’advocating the election or 
defeat of’ a candidate”.46 The disclosure requirements of the 
Act, the Court then said, can only be constitutionally applied 
to expenditures in cases “that include explicit words of 
                                                
42 Deborah Beck et al., Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr., Issue 
Advocacy Advertising During the 1996 Campaign 3 (1997).  
43 Id. 
44 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80. 
45 See supra Part II.1. FECA placed a limit on “independent 
expenditures” “relative to a clearly identified candidate”. 
46 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 42. 
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advocacy of election or defeat.”47 The Court gave examples: words 
or phrases such as "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your 
ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against," "defeat," and 
"reject."48 The presence of these “magic words” identified an ad 
as one that expressly advocated the election or defeat of a 
candidate, as opposed to an ad containing a simple discussion of 
the issues. As an example, Buckley would uphold disclosure 
requirements in the case of expenditures for ads that said “Vote 
Against Smith,” but would strike down disclosure for 
expenditures on ads that said “Call Smith and tell her what you 
think of her plan to gut Medicare.”49  
 While in theory this seems perfectly sensible, anyone who 
has watched a round of campaign advertising recently knows that 
in reality, issue ads do much more than just promote a set of 
ideas. For example, in the 1996 Congressional election, Montana 
Democrat Bill Yellowtail had a slim lead over his Republican 
opponent.50 A few weeks before the election, an ad with the 
following voiceover appeared on television stations around the 
                                                
47 Id. at 43. 
48 Id. at 44 n.52. 
49 Hasen, supra note 36 at 252. 
50 Glenn F. Bunting et al., Nonprofits Behind Attack Ads Prompt 
Senate Probe, L.A. Times, May 5, 1997, at A1. 
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state: “Who is Bill Yellowtail? He preaches family values, but 
he took a swing at his wife. And Yellowtail's explanation? He 
only ‘slapped’ her. But her nose was broken.”51 
 Yellowtail was soundly defeated. Since the ad contained 
none of the Buckley key language, it was classified as issue 
advocacy, and the source of the funds that paid for it was not 
subject to any strict disclosure requirements. 
 The obvious assumption would be that the ad was paid for by 
Yellowtail’s opponent; in fact, he denied any knowledge of it.52 
It was funded by the Citizens for Reform, a conservative, 
Virginia-based group that was formed apparently for the sole 
purpose of sponsoring issue ads during campaigns.53 In the late 
1990s, such groups were easy ways to funnel soft money towards 
political advertising with “total anonymity and no monetary 
limits for their donors.”54 
 Proponents of issue ads believe that it is “exactly what 
the authors of the First Amendment had in mind:” “[e]lection 
campaigns should be a free marketplace of ideas-messy, robust, 
never stifled by regulation. Let the public hear it all, and 
                                                
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 See Beck, supra note 42 at 4. 
54 Bunting, supra note 50. 
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sort it all out.”55 Disclosure requirements, they argue, “would 
have a chilling effect.”56 But critics call such ads “stealth 
attacks” designed to keep the public in the dark.57 They also 
argue that as accountability in political communication 
declines, “levels of misinformation and deceit tend to rise.”58 
The Annenberg Public Policy Center classified over 41% of the 
issue ads aired on radio and television in the 1996 campaign as 
“pure attack” ads.59 
 After years of debate over campaign finance reform, 
Congress finally acted. Their solution? The Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act,60 or, as it is usually called, “McCain-Feingold” 
after the sponsors of the bill, Senators John McCain and Russell 
Feingold. 
 
3. Campaign Finance Disclosure: Round 2 
 McCain-Feingold amended FECA; as part of that amendment, 
the Act established a “bright-line test to identify a new class 
                                                
55 Beck, supra note 42 at 4. 
56 Id. at 5. 
57 Id. at 4. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. at 10. 
60 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155. 
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of political communications subject to federal regulation, which 
it called electioneering communications.”61  McCain-Feingold 
defined “electioneering communication” as “any broadcast, cable, 
or satellite communication clearly identifying a federal 
candidate that appears within 30 days before a primary or 
special election or 60 days before a general election, and which 
is accessible by at least 50,000 members of the candidate's 
constituency.”62  
 The Act subjected the newly-defined electioneering 
communications to disclaimer requirements: if any group or 
individual makes disbursements totaling $10,000 or more in a 
calendar year for electioneering communications, a “clear and 
conspicuous” disclaimer on the communication63 must state (1) 
that the communication was paid for by a candidate if the 
candidate, his election committee, or agent paid for it; (2) 
that the communication was authorized by the candidate, if it 
was so authorized (even if the candidate did not pay for it); or 
                                                
61 The Campaign Legal Center, Regulation of Political Advertising 
in A Brief History of Money and Politics, 
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-46.html (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2005). 
62 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)-(C). 
63 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(c)(1). 
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(3) if the communication was not authorized by a candidate, it 
had to state that, along with the “the full name and permanent 
street address, telephone number, or World Wide Web address of 
the person who paid for the communication.”64 In particular, this 
definition of electioneering communication and the more 
stringent disclosure requirements were designed to help address 
the growing problem of candidate-specific issue advertising.65 
 McCain-Feingold also made an attempt to reduce the power of 
soft money. First, it defined “public communication” as “a 
communication by means of any broadcast, cable, or satellite 
communication, newspaper, magazine, outdoor advertising 
facility, mass mailing, or telephone bank to the general public, 
or any other form of general public political advertising.”66 
Second, it provided that “any ‘public communication’ by a party 
committee that ‘refers to a clearly identified’ federal 
candidate and promotes, supports, attacks, or opposes a 
candidate for that office, ‘regardless of whether the 
communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a 
[federal] candidate’” is considered to be a “federal election 
                                                
64 Id. § 110.11(b)(1)-(3). 
65 The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 61. 
66 2 U.S.C. § 431(22). 
 18 
activity.”67 Federal election activities by party committees have 
to be paid for with what is called “hard money.”68 “Hard Money is 
money or anything of value that a political committee receives 
that satisfies federal contribution limits, source restrictions, 
and disclosure requirements.”69  
 McCain-Feingold’s new definitions of public and 
electioneering communication, and the related disclosure 
requirements, limited the utility of “sham issue ads” (ads 
ostensibly about issues, but functionally advocating for or 
                                                
67 Anthony Corrado, Party Finance in the 2000 Elections: The 
Federal Role of Soft Money Financing, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 1025, 
1052 (2002). 
68 Id. However, “section 527 tax exempt political organizations 
not registered as federal political committees” may still use 
soft money for federal election activities. The Campaign Legal 
Center, Glossary in A Brief History of Money and Politics, 
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-glossary.html#S (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
69 The Campaign Legal Center, Hard Money in A Brief History of 
Money and Politics, http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/f-
hardmoney.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2005). 
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against a candidate) somewhat.70 However, so-called “527s” 
(political organizations formed under Internal Revenue Service 
code section 527) that are not registered with the FEC as 
“political committees” are not required to disclose money spent 
for public communications since they do not receive hard money.71 
527s are groups formed primarily for the purpose of influencing 
the selection of candidates to elected or appointed office.72 For 
the most recent Presidential election, the list of most-active 
527s included such organizations as the Sierra Club, the “Swift 
                                                
70 See Dennis F. Thompson, Two Concepts of Corruption: Making 
Campaigns Safe for Democracy, 73 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1036, 1060 
(2005). 
71 See Jeffrey P. Geiger, Preparing for 2006: A Constitutional 
Argument for Closing the 527 Soft Money Loophole, 47 Wm. and 
Mary L. Rev. 309, 325 (2005) (“Section 527 enables soft money 
donors to influence the outcome of an election while avoiding 
hard money limits”). 
72 See The Brookings Institution, Recent Developments 
in Campaign Finance Regulation, Section 527 Organizations, Feb. 
28, 2001, http://www.brook.edu/gs/cf/headlines/527_intro.htm. 
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Boat Veterans for Truth,” MoveOn.org, and the Natural Resources 
Defense Council.73 
 Under McCain-Feingold, neither the definition of public 
communication or electioneering communication contained any 
reference to Internet-based speech. In fact, when the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) promulgated regulations based on the 
McCain-Feingold amendments, they explicitly excluded 
communications over the Internet.74 That, however, may be about 
to change. 
 
4. The Shays Decision 
 Rep. Christopher Shays and Rep. Martin Meehan challenged 
parts of McCain-Feingold as interpreted by the FEC in Shays v. 
Federal Election Commission.75 Specifically, the Congressmen 
alleged that the FEC’s regulations “thwart[ed] and undermin[ed] 
                                                
73 Opensecrets.org, The Major Players: Active Advocacy Groups in 
the 2004 Election Cycle, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/527grps.asp (last visited Dec. 
18, 2005). 
74 11 C.F.R. § 100.26 (“The term public communication shall not 
include communications over the Internet”). 
75 337 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d 414 F.3d 76 (D.C. Cir. 
2005). 
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the language and congressional purposes” of McCain-Feingold.76 
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
agreed. 
 The court analyzed the language of McCain-Feingold vis-à-
vis the FEC regulations using the standard developed in Chevron, 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.77 The Chevron 
rule is used when an administrative agency regulation or 
decision that is based on the interpretation of a statute is 
challenged.78 Chevron asks a reviewing court to evaluate the 
statute for ambiguity; if none exists, “that is the end of the 
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect 
to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”79 
Should any ambiguity be found, the agency’s interpretation can 
be held valid as long as it is based on a “permissible 
construction of the statute.”80 In Shays, the district court 
found that the FEC’s decision to exclude Internet-based speech 
                                                
76 Id. at 35 (citations omitted). 
77 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
78 See Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 51. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 52. 
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from the definition of public communication failed both prongs 
of the Chevron test.81 
 McCain-Feingold’s definition of public communication 
included, in addition to specific forms of communication, the 
phrase “any other form of general public political 
advertising.”82 The district court did not find that ambiguous,83 
and concluded that “[w]hile all Internet communications do not 
fall within the [definition of ‘any other form of general public 
political advertising’], some clearly do.”84 However, the court 
did not define what specific forms of Internet speech would fall 
under the umbrella of “general public political advertising”; it 
left that task to the FEC.85  
 Moreover, even presupposing some measure of ambiguity in 
McCain-Feingold, the court found that the FEC’s exclusion of all 
Internet communications from the definition of public 
communication was inconsistent with McCain-Feingold’s general 
aims86 and violated Chevron prong two. Should all Internet speech 
                                                
81 Id. at 70. 
82 Id. at 69. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 67. 
85 Id. at 70. 
86 Id. 
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be exempted, the court said, it “would permit an evasion of 
campaign finance laws, thus ‘unduly compromis[ing] the Act's 
purposes,’ and ‘creat[ing] the potential for gross abuse.’”87 
 
5. The FEC’s new rules 
 In response to the Shays court’s ruling, the FEC circulated 
a set of proposed regulations aimed at implementing the required 
changes.88 The new regulations would only require individuals to 
post disclosures on “announcements placed for a fee on another 
person’s or entity’s Web site.”89 In the proposal’s explanatory 
text, the FEC indicates the new regulation would be aimed at 
“paid Internet advertisements . . . if the advertisements either 
solicit contributions or expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate for Federal office.”90 
It seems that the new regulation, then, would only be brought to 
bear on express ads; issue ads would remain unaffected. 
 
                                                
87 Id. (quoting Orloski v. FEC, 795 F.2d 156, 164, 165 (D.C. Cir. 
1986)) (alteration in original). 
88 Internet Communications, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,967 (proposed Apr. 4, 
2005). 
89 Id. at 16,977. 
90 Id. at 16,969 (emphasis added). 
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6. Are the new rules enough to satisfy Shays? 
 Although the current proposed FEC regulations would 
regulate paid express advertisements placed on Web sites,91 it is 
difficult to see how this will be sufficient to satisfy the 
court’s holding in Shays. The Shays court found the FEC’s 
regulatory definition of public communication erroneously 
omitted all Internet-based communication, given McCain-
Feingold’s inclusion of “any other form of general public 
political advertising” in its definition of public 
communication.92 It did so not only because the language of the 
statute appeared to mandate its inclusion, but also because a 
blanket exclusion of Internet speech would thwart the general 
purpose behind the statute.93 How, then, can regulating only paid 
internet advertisements that expressly advocate the election or 
defeat of a candidate be sufficient? 
                                                
91 Id. at 16,970. 
92 Shays, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 67. 
93 Id. at 70. See also 148 Cong. Rec. S2096, 2110-11 (indicating 
that one of the main purposes of McCain-Feingold was to “curb[] 
issue ads, those special interest ads that clearly target 
particular candidates in an attempt to influence the outcome of 
an election”) (statement of Sen. Daschle). 
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 And how should the situation be handled if a political 
campaign has in some way funded a supposedly independent 
blogger? During the 2004 election, the Howard Dean campaign, as 
part of its “Internet outreach,” reached out and paid two 
prominent bloggers to serve as “consultants.”94 In reality, it 
was most likely done to get the bloggers to give Dean “good 
blog.”95 Dean’s “good blog” is an advertisement in the truest 
sense96, and one that is, at least on some level, controlled by a 
candidate. Such an arrangement appears permissible under the new 
FEC rules; there is no strict “announcement placed for a fee.” 
The blogger provides services apart from the advocacy - at 
least, that is the theory. But no doubt the intent of the 
candidate is to generate positive commentary and increase his 
standing among potential voters in much the same way an express 
ad would. Not requiring some measure of disclosure in those 
                                                
94 Chris Suellentrop, Blogging for Dollars, Slate.com, Jan. 14, 
2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112314. 
95 Id. 
96 “Advertising” can be defined as “[t]o make public announcement 
of, especially to proclaim the qualities or advantages of (a 
product or business) so as to increase sales.” The American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (Houghton Mifflin 
Co. 4th ed. 2000)). 
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cases would certainly be seen as circumventing McCain-Feingold’s 
purpose. 
 The Shays court did not address whether or not Internet 
speech might also fall somewhere under McCain-Feingold’s 
definition of electioneering communication; in the plain 
language of the statute, Internet speech is not mentioned, and 
no express FEC regulation exempted (or included) it. But the 
court may have opened the door to examination of Internet speech 
as issue advocacy. Since McCain-Feingold regulates issue 
advocacy that qualifies as an electioneering communication,97 if 
courts were to stretch that definition to include Internet 
speech, McCain-Feingold’s disclaimer requirements would apply. 
As one writer put it, “[i]f you think of those political blogs 
as political ads, then they're worth money-making them subject 
to regulation.”98 If a political blog posting “clearly 
identif[ies] a federal candidate . . . appears within 30 days 
before a primary or special election or 60 days before a general 
                                                
97 The Campaign Legal Center, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act: 
Restoring the Reforms, in A Brief History of Money and Politics, 
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-35.html (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2005). 
98 Learning to Live with the 'Blogosphere', Ventura County Star 
(Cal.), Nov. 12, 2005, at 15. 
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election,”99 and the value of the message meets or exceeds the 
$10,000 limit, the blog might be forced to carry a disclaimer 
identifying the name and address of the person who paid for the 
blog, even if the posting does not expressly advocate the 
election or defeat of a specific candidate. This could 
potentially apply to many political blogs. In fact, the 
Commissioner of the FEC said that “any decision by an individual 
to put a link (to a political candidate) on their home page, set 
up a blog, send out mass e-mails, any kind of activity that can 
be done on the Internet” could ultimately be subject to 
disclosure requirements.100 The anonymous “Wonkettes”101 of the 
world would then have to “clear[ly] and conspicuous[ly]”102 
display their name, address, and phone number for all to see. 
This is troubling, especially given how important anonymous 
political speech has been in our country’s history, and how much 
                                                
99 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A). 
100 Interview by Declan McCullagh with Bradley Smith, 
Commissioner of the FEC (Mar. 3, 2005), 
http://news.com.com/The+coming+crackdown+on+blogging/2008-
1028_3-5597079.html. 
101 Wonkette, Politics for People with Dirty Minds, 
http://www.wonkette.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2005). 
102 11 C.F.R. § 110.11(c)(1). 
 28 
importance the Supreme Court has placed on anonymous political 
speech. 
 
7. Anonymous Political Speech and McIntyre  
 In 1988, Ohio fined Margaret McIntyre $100 for violating a 
state statute. Her offense? Distributing homemade leaflets 
urging voters to defeat a school tax levy. She signed the 
leaflets “Concerned Parents and Taxpayers”--not with her name. 
Ohio prohibited such anonymous political speech103 in order to, 
according to the state, “prevent[] fraudulent and libelous 
statements” and “provid[e] the electorate with relevant 
information.”104 The Supreme Court, however, took a dim view of 
this restriction. In McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,105 
the Court described political speech as “occup[ying] the core of 
the protection afforded by the First Amendment.”106 They held 
that Ohio’s anti-anonymity provision failed “exacting scrutiny,” 
because it was not “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding 
                                                
103 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3599.09(A) (1988). 
104 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995). 
105 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
106 Id. at 346. 
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state interest.”107 “Under our Constitution,” Justice Stevens 
wrote, “anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent. 
Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority.”108 And 
in his concurrence, Justice Thomas pointed out that “the Framers 
understood the First Amendment to protect an author's right to 
express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an 
anonymous fashion.”109 
 But there are limits. The “exacting scrutiny” test would be 
satisfied if an overriding governmental interest is at stake. In 
McIntyre, the Court acknowledged that Ohio’s stated interest in 
preventing fraudulent and libelous statements was nearer that 
mark. The Court nonetheless found this interest insufficient, as 
Ohio had other provisions in its elections code prohibiting 
false statements during political campaigns that it found less 
restrictive on core speech.110  
                                                
107 Id. at 347. “The simple interest in providing voters with 
additional relevant information does not justify a state 
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she 
would otherwise omit.” Id. at 348. 
108 Id. at 357. 
109 Id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). 
110 Id. at 349. 
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 The Buckley Court said that “deter[ing] actual corruption 
and avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption” were sufficiently 
strong interests to uphold restrictions on political speech.111 
Either of these interests then, applied to anonymous political 
speech in the right circumstances, would likely support 
regulation of that speech. 
 
                                                
111 Buckley, supra note 24. The Buckley Court did provide one 
additional consideration for those who wished their 
contributions to political speech to remain anonymous: if there 
was a “reasonable probability” that disclosure would subject the 
contributor to “threats, harassment, or reprisals from 
Government officials or private parties,” he or she was entitled 
to an exemption from the disclosure laws. Richard L. Hasen, The 
Surprisingly Complex Case for Disclosure of Contributions and 
Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 265, 
270 (2000). 
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                                        112 
 
 “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books 
have played an important role in the progress of mankind.”113 In 
addition to the Colonial pamphleteers mentioned earlier, who 
wrote anonymously under threat of reprisal from the British and 
their sympathizers, numerous others have used anonymous speech 
as a tool for communication. Cato’s Letters, a series of essays 
that some call the most influential eighteenth century work on 
freedom of speech and political liberty, were written by two 
                                                
112 Peter Steiner, cartoon in The New Yorker, July 5, 1993, at ? 
113 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
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British men under the pseudonym “Cato.”114 The authors of the 
Federalist Papers (and their opponents, the authors of the Anti-
Federalist Papers), written after the Revolutionary War in 
support of the adoption of the Constitution, chose to keep their 
names secret. After the American Civil War, many writers on 
either side of the issue of slavery chose to keep their 
identities hidden, for obvious reasons.115 “It is plain that 
anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive 
purposes.”116 
 That is not to say that anonymity in itself is inherently 
positive. “One who can lie anonymously is more likely to lie 
than one who will be identified,”117 and the more readily and 
completely one’s identity can be concealed, the greater the risk 
                                                
114 Jonathan D. Wallace, Nameless in Cyberespace, Anonymity on 
the Internet, 54 Cato Institute Briefing Papers 2 (1999). 
115 Id. 
116 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64. 
117 Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the 
Internet, 75 Or. L. Rev. 117, 125 (1996). 
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that the anonymous speech is suspect, or an outright 
falsehood.118 
 The Internet is certainly an easy place to be anonymous. 
Aliases can be used; email addresses can be crafted to hide real 
names (and even hidden behind special “anonymizers” called 
remailers119); a special server called an “anonymous proxy” can 
serve as a “go-between” to retrieve web pages for a client 
disguising the location of the client and the client’s Internet 
address.120 In such cases, only the most technically-inclined 
sleuth might ferret out someone’s true identity.  
 
                                                
118 See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L. J. 
1743, 1750 (1995) (“Perfect anonymity makes perfect crime 
possible”). 
119 André Bacard, Anonymous Remailer FAQ, 
http://www.andrebacard.com/remail.html (last visited Oct. 31, 
2005). 
120 See Proxy Blind: Solutions for Security, Privacy, and 
Anonymity on the Net, http://www.proxyblind.org/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2005). 
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1. Can you really blog anonymously? 
 When it comes to blogging, however, it is much more 
difficult to remain completely anonymous.121 Most blogging tools 
require at least a contact email address. Even if that email 
address uses some sort of technology to mask the real user 
behind it, a blogger must still connect to the blog server with 
his computer in order to post messages. In establishing this 
connection, it is likely the blog server would record the 
Internet address of the connecting computer in its logs, 
providing a way to trace back to the connecting computer. 
Anonymous proxies can mitigate that somewhat (as well as using 
public computer systems like those found in a public library), 
but connection records from those proxies (or the records of 
anonymous remailers) might be accessible, for example, by 
subpoena.122 To combat these legal and technological methods of 
                                                
121 See Concurring Opinions: Is Anonymous Blogging Possible?, 
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2005/11/is_anonymous_
bl_1.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2005). 
122 See Robb S. Harvey and Richard G. Sanders, “Outing” the 
Anonymous Internet Poster, 17 Intellectual Prop. Litig. 1, 17 
(2005). Some jurisdictions, most notably California, provide 
special laws called “Anti-SLAPP” statutes that limit lawsuits 
aimed at interfering with First Amendment rights. Id.  
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detection, savvy Internet programmers are currently in the 
process of developing truly anonymous methods of posting.123 
 In the meantime, of course, most bloggers who wish to 
remain anonymous will simply post messages under a pseudonym. To 
the general Internet user, this would probably be sufficient to 
hide the poster’s true identity. 
 
2. The Blogoshpere124 and the Rise of Political Blogs 
 It is unknown exactly how and when blogs began. One of the 
earliest acknowledged bloggers was a college student at 
Swarthmore, who began compiling an online diary in 1994.125 The 
first public blogging service, “Open Diary,” started up in 
                                                
123 See, for example, http://www.invisiblog.com (“You don't ever 
have to reveal your identity - not even to us. You don't have to 
trust us, because we'll never know who you are”). The service is 
still under development. 
124  “Blogosphere . . . is the collective term encompassing all 
weblogs or blogs as a community or social network.” Wikipedia: 
Blogosphere, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blogosphere (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2005). 
125 Jeffrey Rosen, Your Blog or Mine? New York Times Magazine, 
Dec. 19, 2004, at 24. 
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1998.126 Blog growth was steady, but relatively modest, with only 
23 blogs known to be in existence at the beginning of 1999.127 
Although publishing a blog was a relatively straightforward 
task, it required a working knowledge of the structural language 
of Web pages (HTML, or Hypertext Markup Language). Then in the 
summer of 1999, free blog tools Pitas, Blogger, and Groksoup 
launched. These services provided an easy-to-use Web-based 
interface for blog publishing, and the modest growth “turned 
into an explosion,”128 with the user base for some services 
expanding by 30 percent monthly.129 It was only a matter of time 
before blogs devoted to politics would arise. 
                                                
126 Wikipedia, Blog: Blogging Begins, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog#Blogging_begins (last visited 
Nov. 3, 2005). 
127 Rebecca Blood, Weblogs: A History and Perspective, 
http://www.rebeccablood.net/essays/weblog_history.html (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2005). 
128 Id. 
129 Leander Kahney, The Web the Way It Was, Wired News (Feb. 23, 
2000), http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,34006,00.html. 
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 The first established political blogs launched in 2001 and 
2002.130 Initially rather quiet and unobtrusive, these political 
blogs first flexed their online muscle during the Trent 
Lott/Strom Thurmond scandal of 2002. At Senator Thurmond’s 100th 
birthday celebration, Senator Lott made a remark that Thurmond, 
who had run on a segregationist platform for President in 1948, 
would have made a good President.131 
 No one seemed to think much of it at the time; most articles 
on the celebration even omitted the quote.132 The remark might 
have faded away as a minor blunder if not for the attention of 
liberal bloggers. By keeping the scandal at the forefront of the 
online political debate, the bloggers eventually drew the 
                                                
130 Wikipedia, supra note 126. These first important political 
blogs were andrewsullivan.com, politics1.com, mydd.com, and 
dailykos.com. Id. 
131 “I want to say this about my state: When Strom Thurmond ran 
for president, we voted for him. We're proud of it. And if the 
rest of the country had followed our lead, we wouldn't have had 
all these problems over all these years, either.” Glen Elsasser 
& Jill Zuckman, S.C. Senator Personified Changing South, Chicago 
Tribune, June 27, 2003, at 1. 
132 Richard L. Berke, What You Say Can't Hurt You Until It Can, 
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2003, § 4, at 3. 
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attention of mainstream media. The spotlight ultimately resulted 
in the resignation of Senator Lott as U.S. Senate Majority 
Leader.133 
 Recently, conservative political bloggers scored a success of 
their own in the “Rathergate” scandal of 2004. After Dan Rather 
presented documents on a segment of the “60 Minutes II” CBS 
television show purporting to cast a negative light on President 
Bush’s service in the Texas Air National Guard, bloggers were 
online within hours questioning the documents’ authenticity.134 
The mainstream media quickly picked up the story, and 
eventually, a CBS investigation led to the conclusion that the 
documents were most likely fakes.135 Several CBS producers lost 
their jobs, and CBS’s reputation was damaged.136 
 Since then, blogs and the Internet have grown even more 
pervasive as a source for political news. Eighty-four million 
Americans used the Internet to get political news on and 
                                                
133 Id. 
134 Wikipedia: Rathergate, 





participate in the 2004 Presidential election.137 It is estimated 
that eleven million people relied on political blogs as a 
primary source of information during that election.138 The 
influence of online political speech continues unabated. 
 While the people behind a number of the most influential 
political blogs are known, there exist several blogs whose 
primary contributors remain anonymous.139 Even on established 
blogs whose operators are known, sometimes significant numbers 
of individual contributors remain anonymous.140 Given the tenuous 
state of anonymous online political speech, their postings, if 
they choose not to reveal their names, may be stopped. 
 
                                                
137 Pew Internet & American Life Project, Trends 2005, Chapter 4, 
Internet: The Mainstreaming of Online Life, 
http://www.pewInternet.org/pdfs/Internet_Status_2005.pdf (last 
visited Oct 30, 2005). 
138 Jessica Mintz, When Bloggers Make News – As Their Count 
Increases, Web Diarists are Asking: Just What Are the Rules? 
Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 2005, at B1. 
139 See, for example, http://www.lowculture.com; 
http://thenexthurrah.typepad.com; http://www.billmon.org. 
140 See, for example, http://www.wonkette.com; 
http://www.dailykos.com. 
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IV. PROTECTING ANONYMOUS ONLINE POLITICAL SPEECH FROM 
DISCLOSURE 
 “We've heard that a million monkeys at a million keyboards 
 could produce the complete works of Shakespeare; now,  
 thanks to the Internet, we know that is not true.”  
       - Robert Wilensky141 
 Given the Supreme Court’s rule that disclosure is 
permissible, but their stance that anonymous political speech is 
to be honored, what is to be done with anonymous political 
bloggers?  
 
1. Shays and Anonymous Political Blogs 
 The Supreme Court has already articulated a “substantial 
government interest” in compelled disclosure for express 
advocates: the prevention of corruption.142 That interest extends 
to identified as well as anonymous speakers. The McIntyre Court 
all but said its holding striking down Ohio’s law prohibiting 
anonymous campaigning was restricted to “referenda or other 
issue-based ballot measures.”143 The Shays court has ruled that 
Internet-based political speech is subject to McCain-Feingold’s 
                                                
141 Robert Wilensky, speech at a 1996 conference (need specifics) 
142 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 83. 
143 McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 356. 
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definition of public communication, and the court may have also 
effectively extended application of the definition of 
electioneering communication to that speech.144 Where does this 
leave anonymous blogs? Barring any future legislative action to 
the contrary, they are likely subject to the disclaimer 
requirements of FECA and McCain-Feingold.  
 
2. Application of the Press Exemption  
 The Federal Election Campaign Act exempts most press 
coverage from regulation. It “excludes from the definitions of 
contribution, expenditure, and electioneering communication any 
communication appearing in a news story, commentary, or 
editorial.”145 The FEC grants press entities the exemption if 
they are “acting in their usual press capacity” when they 
publish.146 The key question is, then, “can bloggers be 
considered journalists?” 
                                                
144 See supra Part II.6. 
145 The Campaign Legal Center, Regulation of Political 
Advertising in A Brief History of Money and Politics, 
http://www.campaignfinanceguide.org/guide-47.html (last visited 
Dec. 12, 2005). 
146 Id. 
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 Most of the laws in this country that protect journalists 
are much newer than the First Amendment.147 They were passed in 
recent decades “to protect and foster a specific activity called 
reporting.”148 It seems, then, that any blogger, anonymous or 
not, who is engaged in reporting should be covered by the FEC’s 
press exemption. After all, it can be argued that the reporting 
performed by a blogger is no less valuable than reporting 
performed by a person for, say, the New York Times. Both are in 
the pursuit of information that is essential to an informed 
public, an important goal especially in the political process.149 
One might also think that a reporter employed by the Times, 
working under their code of ethics,150 and trained in journalism 
would naturally produce more trustworthy, reliable reporting 
than an anonymous blogger. The Jayson Blair scandal effectively 
                                                
147 Daly, supra note 13. 
148 Id. Daly defines “reporting” as “the pursuit . . . of 
verifiable facts and verbatim quotations.” 
149 See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15 (“In a republic where 
the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make 
informed choices among candidates for office is essential.”) 
150 New York Times Co., The New York Times: Guidelines on 
Integrity, http://www.nytco.com/company-properties-times-
integrity.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2005). 
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disproves that notion.151  The fact that a blogger might publish 
the fruits of his reporting anonymously does not necessarily 
make the information less reliable. A reader can weigh the fact 
that the identity of the reporter is unknown when deciding how 
much significance to give the information.152 
 What about bloggers that function not necessarily as 
reporters, but as commentators? The FEC does not draw a 
distinction between reporting and presenting analysis or 
commentary when granting the exemption.153 If bloggers would be 
entitled to an exemption for reporting, it would not make sense 
                                                
151 See John J. Goldman and Josh Getlin, Reporter Fabricated, 
Plagiarized Stories, N.Y. Times Says, Los Angeles Times, May 11, 
2003, at 36. Jayson Blair was fired from his job as a reporter 
at the New York Times for, among other things, making up quotes 
and plagiarizing material from other publications. Id. Blair was 
not the only high-profile reporter exposed for fabricating 
stories. Other well-known journalists caught making similar 
missteps included Janet Cooke of the Washington Post, Stephen 
Glass of the New Republic, and Mike Barnicle and Patricia Smith, 
both of the Boston Globe. See Gina Lubrano, Why Newspapers Rely 
on News Services, San Diego Union-Tribune, May 26, 2003, at B7. 
152 See infra Part IV.5. 
153 See The Campaign Legal Center, supra note 142. 
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to exclude them from the exemption in cases when the blogger is 
offering commentary. And the FEC apparently agrees. 
 In a unanimous vote on November 17, 2005, the FEC “issued 
a[n] advisory opinion extending the . . . press exemption to 
people who disseminate news and commentary on the Internet.”154 
The opinion was specifically directed at websites created by 
Fired Up, a Missouri-based company that runs pro Democratic Web 
sites in Maryland, Missouri and Washington.155 The FEC declared 
that the websites in question, although clearly politically 
biased, “fall within the legitimate press function.”156 
 Some supporters of McCain-Feingold, though, have concerns. 
Particularly, they “fear that party organizations will be able 
to take advantage of the exemption for bloggers by launching Web 
sites that appear to be independently controlled.”157 In doing 
so, political parties could circumvent the controls of McCain-
Feingold via the Internet. That is certainly a possibility, 
although a party would risk a potential public relations 
                                                
154 Suzanne Nelson, FEC Extends Press Exemption to Blogs, Roll 
Call, Nov. 21, 2005. 
155 FEC Unanimously Approves Media Exemption For Some Blogs, 
CongressDaily, Nov. 18, 2005. 
156 Id. 
157 Nelson, supra note 154. 
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disaster should the scheme be found out. But those fears are 
largely unfounded. The public tends to trust only those news 
sources that have been in existence for an extended period of 
time.158 While the meaning of “extended period of time” is much 
shorter in terms of the Internet than as applied to traditional 
media outlets (the Internet as most people have come to know it 
has only been in existence since 1991159) it still follows that 
those websites and blogs with a significant history will be 
deemed more reliable that ones the pop up immediately before an 
election.160 
                                                
158 See Jeffrey A. Dvorkin, Hello, Mom? What Makes a Source 
Reliable?, NPR.org, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5014165, 
Nov. 15, 2005 (“Trust is a quality that is only achieved through 
years of on-going, reliable journalism.”) 
159 Wikipedia: World Wide Web, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_Wide_Web (“August 6, 1991 . . 
. marked the debut of the Web as a publicly available service on 
the Internet.”) (last visited Dec. 9, 2005). 
160 One further point: in the last Presidential election, Howard 
Dean put two well-known liberal bloggers on his payroll. See 
supra Part II.6. Since these bloggers, ostensibly independent 
journalists, were in the employ of a candidate for President, 
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3. Application of the Volunteer Exemption  
 “[C]ampaign finance laws [also] allow for a ‘volunteer 
exemption’: The amount of money an individual spends on his or 
her own volunteer activity is not counted as a contribution to a 
campaign.”161 The exemption specifically provides that the use of 
personal property at an individual’s place of residence does not 
fall under the definition of “contribution” as long as the 
amount expended is less than $1,000 per election (and less than 
$2,000 in a calendar year).162 Clearly this exemption would not 
apply to the big blogs, but home-based bloggers probably can 
                                                
they should not be entitled to an exemption since any reporting 
on the election would fall outside the FEC’s requirement of 
“acting in their usual press capacity.” See supra note 146. 
161 Zachary Roth, Beware of the "Halli-bloggers"!, Salon.com, 
http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/07/09/fec_bloggers (July 
9, 2005).  
162 See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8)(B)(ii) (“The term ‘contribution’ does 
not include . . . the use of real or personal property . . . in 
rendering voluntary personal services on the individual's 
residential premises  . . . to the extent that the value does 
not exceed $ 1,000 with respect to any single election and . . . 
$2,000 in any calendar year”). 
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breathe easy. The cost to set up and maintain a basic blog is so 
low,163 they would likely be covered. The calculation can become 
sticky, however, and this bright-line test may not be so bright. 
How should the costs of personal computer equipment be 
allocated? How about a personal Internet connection? If an 
enterprising blogger maintains his own server, does that expense 
count towards the limit? If the blog itself is not primarily 
political, do you have to apportion the costs by making some 
sort of calculation based on the “politicalness” of the blog? If 
the equipment used in creating the blog is not exclusive to the 
blog or website, does the value calculation take into 
consideration what percentage of “non-blog” use the computer 
gets? Even though the exemption exists, if someone is near that 
bright line, the sheer complexity of figuring out if the 
exemption applies might be enough to scare them off. 
 One of the main problems in applying the exemptions is 
that, although Congress has granted the FEC lawmaking powers to 
interpret the Federal Election Campaign Act,164 those decisions 
are vulnerable to court rulings, just as the FEC’s definition of 
                                                
163 See supra note 10. 
164 Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit: Constitutional Law, 70 Geo. 
Wash. L. Rev. 328, 349-50 (2002). 
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“public communication” was overruled by the Shays court. 
Congress can, of course, cure these problems by simply crafting 
legislation that draws a better bright-line. However, though 
several proposals have been advanced, so far none has garnered 
enough support to become law. 
  
4. Legislative Action  
 On Nov. 2, 2005, the “House of Representatives . . . 
narrowly turned back an effort to exempt all Internet 
communication from campaign-finance regulations.”165 Texas 
Representative Jeb Hensarling’s Online Freedom of Speech Act166 
would have “exclude[d] blogs, e-mails and some other Internet 
communications from federal regulation.”167 The bill “would have 
. . . allow[ed] corporations, labor unions, and individuals to 
spend unlimited amounts on Internet ads supporting 
                                                
165 Rick Klein, Internet campaign exemption defeated, Boston 
Globe, Nov. 3, 2005, at A1. 
166 Online Freedom of Speech Act, H.R. 1606, 109th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2005). The bill would have codified the FEC’s exclusion of 
Internet-based speech from McCain-Feingold’s definition of 
“public communication.” Id. at § 2. 
167 George Will, Free Speech Under Siege, Newsweek, Dec. 5, 2005, 
at 76. 
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candidates.”168 Government watchdog groups and some legislators  
opposed the measure, alleging that the bill would “bring[] 
corrupt, soft money back into federal campaigns.”169 In response, 
Representatives Martin Meehan and Christopher Shays (of Shays v. 
FEC fame) filed an “alternative bill that would protect bloggers 
from government regulation, but maintain the current system 
where Internet advertising is subject to the same limits placed 
on advertising in other media.”170 The House of Representatives 
did not consider that bill, because the sponsors of the Online 
Freedom of Speech Act used a special “fast-track” maneuver to 
bring the Act to a vote, which precluded any amendments from 
                                                




being offered and severely limited debate.171 That haphazard 
introduction no doubt doomed Hensarling’s Act.172 
 Undaunted, however, Representative Brad Miller of North 
Carolina introduced a more targeted bill, to amend the Federal 
Election Campaign Act to “exempt news stories, commentaries, and 
editorials distributed through the Internet from treatment as 
expenditures or electioneering communications.”173 As of this 
writing, the bill is under consideration by the House Committee 
on House Administration. Considering, however, the narrow defeat 
of the Online Free Speech Act, the current bill, which protects 
online speech without introducing loopholes for online ads (and, 
therefore, minus the attendant worries of corruption) would seem 
                                                
171 Id. The “fast-track” maneuver, known as a “Suspension of the 
Rules,” requires a bill receive a two-thirds majority to pass. 
The Online Freedom of Speech Act only received a simple majority 
(225 for, 186 against). Id. Although the Act failed, the 
majority vote indicates that Congress (or at least the House of 
Representatives) may be ready to consider the matter, and to 
pass laws protecting Internet-based speech. 
172 Rep. Barney Frank, referring to the lack of available debate, 
said, "It's self-parody. Let's all defend free speech without 
having any." Klein, supra note 165. 
173 H.R. 4389, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005). 
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to have a good chance to pass, and those who wish to post 
anonymously will be able do so without fear. 
 
5. What should be done? 
 Three options exist to protect anonymous online political 
speech: 1) maintain the status quo, and hope the new FEC 
advisory opinion is sufficient in light of Shays;174 2) find some 
way to apply the FEC’s press or volunteer exemptions;175 or 3) 
wait for Congress to do something.176 None of these are 
particularly enticing. 
 On first reflection it seems as though enforcing disclosure 
rules on anonymous online political speech is antithetical to 
the founding fathers’ purpose in enacting the First Amendment. 
After all, shouldn’t “no law” mean “no law”?177 However, as has 
been discovered in the 214 years since ratification of the First 
Amendment, “no law” really means “limited laws.” And those 
limited laws generally make a lot of sense. But here, when 
confronted with the same type of speech that was so important to 
                                                
174 See supra Part II.5. 
175 See supra Parts IV.2-IV.3. 
176 See supra Part IV.4. 
177 “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.” U.S. Const. amend. I. 
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the very founding of this country,178 some courts and members of 
Congress seem ready to throw a regulatory blanket over its use. 
Given the tremendous amounts of money spent on political 
campaigns, some regulation, under the Buckley guise of 
preventing corruption, is probably warranted. 
 But not here. Anonymous political speech has a built-in 
limiting function: it’s anonymous. Any person reading a posting 
written by someone who refuses to give their real name can 
simply consider the source, and determine the trustworthiness of 
the message appropriately. In the “marketplace of ideas,” 
consumers of those ideas can pick and choose among those they 
deem reliable.179 It follows that the marketplace serves its 
function best if consumers have a wide selection to choose from. 
 Considering the importance of the speech in question, and 
Buckley’s corruption concerns, the most viable option currently 
available is Representative Brad Miller’s current bill before 
the House of Representatives.180 It exempts key anonymous online 
political speech from disclosure, while keeping in place current 
                                                
178 See supra Part I. 
179 See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967) (“The 
‘marketplace of ideas’ . . . still remains the best testing 
ground for truth”). 
180 See supra note 173. 
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controls over online political advertising.181 The House of 
Representatives should act soon to bring this bill out of 
committee, and to the floor for debate and vote. Until then, 
anonymous online political speech is in danger. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 “[E]rror of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left 
free to combat it.” 
       - Thomas Jefferson182 
 In the end, the Supreme Court’s assertion in Buckley that 
disclosure requirements serve the purpose of preventing 
corruption may be a bit overblown. Perhaps we are fortunate 
there was no Buckley rule in the 1760s: the American Revolution 
might never have happened. Now, in light of Buckley, McCain-
Feingold, and especially Shays, online commentators might think 
twice about posting a controversial piece, since it may very 
well have to be accompanied by their name and address. 
Admittedly, preventing corruption is an honorable goal. But the 
public as a whole gets far too little credit for being able to 
spot a fake. We entrust a panel of ordinary men and women with 
the power to declare a criminal defendant guilty or innocent, or 
                                                
181 See supra Part IV.4. 
182 Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801). 
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even send him to his death, but not to sift out questionable 
political commentary: 
Don't underestimate the common man. People are intelligent 
enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing. They 
can see it is anonymous. They know it is anonymous. They 
can evaluate its anonymity along with its message, as long 
as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that 
message. And then, once they have done so, it is for them 
to decide what is “responsible”, what is valuable, and what 
is truth.183 
 For those still unconvinced, perhaps Douglas Adams said it 
best: “Don't believe anything you read on the net. Except this. 
Well, including this, I suppose.”184 
 If the Federal Government wants to require a disclaimer on 




                                                
183 New York v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 996 (1974). 
184 Posting of Douglas Adams to alt.fan.douglas-adams (Sept. 13, 
1998). 
 
